A Compositional Model of Consciousness based on Consciousness-Only by Signorelli, Camilo Miguel et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
16
13
8v
1 
 [q
-b
io.
NC
]  
31
 Ju
l 2
02
0
Article
A Compositional Model of Consciousness based on
Consciousness-Only
Camilo Miguel Signorelli 1,2,∗, Quanlong Wang 1,3,∗, Ilyas Khan3,4,∗
1 Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
2 Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM U992, NeuroSpin
3 Cambridge Quantum Computing Ltd
4 St Edmund’s College, University of Cambridge
* Correspondence: cam.signorelli@cs.ox.ac.uk; quaang@cs.ox.ac.uk; ilyas@cambridgequantum.com
Version August 3, 2020 submitted to Preprints
Abstract: Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is independent of any
consciousness. This theoretical-assumption leads to the "hard problem" of consciousness. We avoid
this problem by assuming consciousness to be fundamental, and the main feature of consciousness
is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes the
other-dependent feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious
processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their
relations with other generators, and therefore other-dependent. The framework is general enough,
i.e. parameters in the morphisms take values in arbitrary commutative semi-rings, from which any
finitely dimensional system can be dealt with. Our proposal fits well into a compositional model of
consciousness and is an important step forward that addresses both the hard problem of consciousness
and the combination problem of (proto)-panpsychism.
Keywords: Consciousness; Conscious Agents; Compositionality; Combination problem; Mathematics
of Conciousness; Monoidal Categories; Panpsychism.
1. Introduction
Despite scientific advances in understanding the objective neural correlates of consciousness [1],
science has so far failed in recovering subjective features from objective and measurable correlates of
consciousness. One example is the unity of consciousness. Current models postpone the explanation
of that unity, assuming there will be further developments [2]. In the meantime, they reduce conscious
experience to neural events.
In this article, we present an alternative approach: consciousness as a fundamental process of
nature. This strategy addresses reductionism and the hard problem of consciousness. Our approach
takes inspiration from the Yogacara school [3,4], and is also in line with the hypothesis of conscious
agents [5] and phenomenology [6,7]. In our framework, a key feature of consciousness is characterised
as "other-dependent nature", i.e. the nature of existence arising from causes and conditions. Without
falling into idealism or dualism, we propose that consciousness should be treated as a primitive process.
To model the other-dependent nature, we propose a compositional model for consciousness. This
model is based on symmetric monoidal categories (Section 2), also called Process Theory [8,9]. Process
theory is an abstract framework which describes how processes are composed, and thus ontologically
neutral. It has been widely used in various research fields such as the foundations of physical
theories [10], quantum theory [11,12], causal models [13,14], relativity [15] and interestingly also natural
language [16] and cognition [17,18]. At the core of process theory lies the principle of compositionality.
Compositionality describes any unity as a composition, possibly non-trivially, of some basic processes
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[8,9]. In this paper, we use a fine-grained version of process theory called ZX-calculus to model Alaya
consciousness (Section 3). In our model, we use generators in the form of basic diagrams. A diagram
represents processes defined by interdependent relations (Section 4, 4.1, 4.1.1 and 4.1.2), exhibiting the
other-dependence feature of consciousness. The framework also comes with a standard interpretation
for each diagram (Section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4), making our theory sound, i.e. without internal contradictions.
This makes process theory and our compositional framework suitable for investigating the irreducible
structural properties of conscious experience [19].
This framework may become an important step forward, by mathematizing phenomenology to
target major questions of conscious experience [20]. For instance, the unity of consciousness naturally
arises as result of composition, and the combination problem of fundamental experiences is described as
an application of our framework (Section 5). This new perspective of scientific models of consciousness
invokes pure mathematical entities, avoiding ontological claims, without the need for any physical
realization (Section 6).
2. Category Theory and Process Theory
In this section, we briefly introduce the basic notions of Category theory [21], process theories [9]
and graphical calculus [22].
2.1. Preliminaries
Category
A category C consists of:
• a class of objects ob(C);
• for each pair of objects A, B, a set C(A, B) of morphisms from A to B;
• for each triple of objects A, B,C, a composition map
C(B,C)× C(A, B) −→ C(A,C)
(g, f ) 7→ g ◦ f ;
• for each object A, an identity morphism 1A ∈ C(A, A),
satisfying the following axioms:
• associativity: for any f ∈ C(A, B), g ∈ C(B,C), h ∈ C(C,D), there holds (h ◦ g) ◦ f = h ◦ (g ◦ f );
• identity law: for any f ∈ C(A, B), 1B ◦ f = f = f ◦ 1A.
A morphism f ∈ C(A, B) is an isomorphism if there exists a morphism g ∈ C(B, A) such that g ◦ f = 1A
and f ◦ g = 1B. A product category A×B can be defined componentwise by two categories A andB.
Functor
Given categories C andD, a functor F : C −→ D consists of:
• a mapping
ob(C) −→ ob(D)
A 7→ F(A);
• for each pair of objects A, B of C, a map
C(A, B) −→ D(F(A), F(B))
f 7→ F( f ),
3 of 20
satisfying the following axioms:
• preserving composition: for any morphisms f ∈ C(A, B), g ∈ C(B,C), there holds F(g ◦ f ) =
F(g) ◦ F( f );
• preserving identity: for any object A of C, F(1A) = 1F(A).
A functor F : C −→ D is faithful (full) if for each pair of objects A, B of C, the map
C(A, B) −→ D(F(A), F(B))
f 7→ F( f )
is injective (surjective).
A bifunctor (also called binary functor) is just a functor whose domain is the product of two
categories.
Natural transformation
Let F,G : C −→ D be two functors. A natural transformation τ : F → G is a family (τA : F(A) −→
G(A))A∈C of morphisms inD such that the following square commutes:
F(A)
τA
F( f )
G(A)
F(B)
τB
G( f )
G(B)
for all morphisms f ∈ C(A, B). A natural isomorphism is a natural transformation where each of the
τA is an isomorphism.
Strict monoidal category
A strict monoidal category consists of:
• a category C;
• a unit object I ∈ ob(C);
• a bifunctor −⊗− : C× C −→ C,
satisfying
• associativity: for each triple of objects A, B,C of C, A⊗ (B⊗ C) = (A⊗ B)⊗ C; for each triple of
morphisms f , g, h of C, f ⊗ (g⊗ h) = ( f ⊗ g)⊗ h;
• unit law: for each object A of C, A⊗ I = A = I ⊗ A; for each morphism f of C, f ⊗ 1I = f = 1I ⊗ f .
Strict symmetric monoidal category
A strict monoidal category C is symmetric if it is equipped with a natural isomorphism
σA,B : A⊗ B → B⊗ A
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for all objects A, B,C of C satisfying:
σB,A ◦ σA,B = 1A⊗B, σA,I = 1A, (1B ⊗ σA,C) ◦ (σA,B ⊗ 1C) = σA,B⊗C.
Strict monoidal functor
Given two strict monoidal categories C and D, a strict monoidal functor F : C −→ D is a functor
F : C −→ D such that F(A)⊗ F(B) = F(A⊗ B), F( f )⊗ F(g) = F( f ⊗ g), F(IC) = ID, for any objects A, B
of C, and any morphisms f ∈ C(A, A1), g ∈ C(B, B1).
A strict symmetric monoidal functor F is a strict monoidal functor that preserves symmetrical
structures, i.e., F(σA,B) = σF(A),F(B). The definition of a general (non-strict) symmetric monoidal functor
can be found in [21].
Strict compact closed category
A strict compact closed category is a strict symmetric monoidal category C such that for each object
A of C, there exists a object A∗ and two morphisms
ǫA : A⊗ A
∗ → I, ηA : I → A
∗ ⊗ A
satisfying:
(ǫA ⊗ 1A) ◦ (1A ⊗ ηA) = 1A, (1
∗
A ⊗ ǫA) ◦ (ηA ⊗ 1
∗
A) = 1
∗
A.
A strict compact closed category is called self-dual if A = A∗ for each object A [12].
2.2. Process Theory
Process theory is an abstract description of how things have happened, be they mental or physical
and regardless of their nature. In common with all theories, process theory has its own assumptions,
albeit with the advantage that it’s major feature is that it contains minimal assumptions.
We first assume an event to have occurred. i.e., a change from something typed as A to something
typed as B. This is called a process and denoted as a box:
f
B
A
Second, we assume that it is impossible that all the things happened simultaneously and thereafter
ceased. So there must be processes, say g and f , that happen sequentially:
g
f
A
B
C
f happens after g can be seen as a single process from type C to type B, which is denoted by f ◦
g : C → B. This means processes admit sequential composition. As such, three things happening in
sequence is seen as one process without any ambiguity, i.e., the sequential composition of processes is
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associative: ( f ◦ g) ◦ h = f ◦ (g ◦ h). We also assume that for each type A, there exists a process called the
identity 1A, which does nothing at all to A. This is depicted as a straight line:
A
As a consequence, give a process f : A → B, we have 1B ◦ f = f = f ◦ 1A .
Third, we assume that there should be different "things" happening simultaneously. Two processes
f and g that happen simultaneously are described as:
f g
C
DB
A
If we view two types, say A and C, as a single type which we denote as A⊗C, then the simultaneous
processes f and g can be seen as a single process from type A ⊗ C to type B ⊗ D which we denote as
f ⊗ g : A⊗ C → B⊗ D. So we have a parallel composition of processes. The above depiction of f ⊗ g
is asymmetric: f on the left while g on the right. This is due to the limitation of a planar drawing. Two
processes that occur simultaneously should be placed in a symmetric way, which means that if we swap
their positions, they should be essentially the same where all the types should match. This can be realised
by adding a swap process
BA
AB
such that
=
f
f
g
g
A
A
A
B
B B
C
C
C
D
D D
With these basic assumptions, processes can be organised into what is called a process theory in the
framework of a strict symmetric monoidal category (SMC). A much more detailed description of process
theory can be found in [12].
Furthermore, in this paper, we also consider the origin of space and time as part of our framework.
Intuitively, time emerges from sequentially happened processes, and space is a form which displays
simultaneously happened processes. Similar to the theory of relativity where space and time are a
unified entity, here we assume that space and time are related to each other in the sense that sequential
composition and parallel composition are convertible. This is realized by adding the compact structure
to the process theory, then we have:
f
=
f g
g
A
B
C
A
B B∗
C∗ C
Mathematically speaking, we now have a compact closed category.
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Since process theory focuses on the processes instead of the objects, they provide a
philosophical advantage: process theories emphasise transformations, avoiding any ontological claim
or "substance-like" description.
2.3. Fine-grained Version of Process Theory
In general process theory, most of the boxes (processes) are unspecified in the sense that what
is inside a box is unknown, whereas we need to know more details about their interactions in some
applications. In other words, we need a fine-grained version of process theory. The typical way to
derive such a version is to generate all the processes by a set of basic processes called generators,
while specifying those generators in terms of equations of processes composed of generators. Below,
we illustrate this idea by a typical example called ZX-calculus.
ZX-calculus is a process theory invented by Bob Coecke and Ross Duncan as a graphical language
for a pair of complementary quantum processes (represented by two diagrams called green spider and
red spider respectively) [22]. All the processes in ZX-calculus are diagrams composed sequentially or
in parallel, either of green spiders with phase parameters, red spiders with phase parameters, straight
lines, swaps, caps or cups. These generators satisfy a set of diagrammatic equations called rewriting
rules: one can rewrite each diagram into an equivalent one by replacing a part of the diagram which
is on one side of an equation with the diagram on the other side of the equation. All the ZX diagrams
modulo 1 and the rewriting rules form a self-dual compact closed category [22]. To guarantee that there
are no conflicts in this rewriting system, ZX-calculus needs a property called soundness: there exists an
standard interpretation from the category of ZX diagrams to the category of matrices, i.e., a symmetric
monoidal functor between them [22].
3. Why use a compositional approach based on consciousness-only
In this section, we motivate and explain the concepts of consciousness as fundamental and also the
structure for consciousness given by Yogacara School.
3.1. Process Theory for consciousness
In any attempt of modelling consciousness, we expect to fulfill at least three theoretical requirements.
First, one would like a theory with a basic and minimum set of assumptions. Process theory is such a
framework. Symmetric monoidal categories start from a minimum and specific intuitive form to deal
with compositions, sequential and parallel, between different mathematical categories and structures
(section 2.2). As introduced in section 2, symmetric monoidal categories define process theories, where
the morphisms of the category are treated as processes or transformations.
Second, one would expect those minimum assumption to be explicit. In other words, we need to
model the nature of consciousness from explicit, primitive and axiomatic principles. Process theory in
particular, and category theory in general, provides us with an exceptionally well suited mathematical
framework for such axiomatic purposes. Since assumptions in process theory are minimal, any extra
structure needs to be explicitly added and have explicit mathematical meaning.
Third, one would like to recover important properties of consciousness from those basic and explicit
axioms. Specifically the unity of consciousness. According to the phenomenology of consciousness,
one of the most salient features of conscious experience is its unity [23,24]. Importantly, in process
theory, unity is formed by sequential and parallel compositions. Under those operations, the concept
1 Modulo means using an equivalent relation.
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of compositionality defines the whole as compositions of the parts. These parts however, are not
trivial decompositions, they contain in themselves the very properties that define the whole (in our
case, processes compound other processes). Parts and the whole are therefore defined together.
Compositionality is thus a middle ground between reductionism and holism. Due to this foundational
aspect, compositionality is a convenient way to target the unity of consciousness (section 5).
3.2. Consciousness as Fundamental
At the heart of a general theory of consciousness there always lies the mind-body problem: how
physical processes (physical properties, neural events and the body) are related to a conscious subjective
experience (mental properties, qualia)? [23,25,26]. The answers to this problem diverge into two main
paths: dualism and physicalism (sometimes also called materialism). Dualism holds the view that the
mental and the physical are both real and neither can be reduced to the other. The main difficulty of
dualism is the problem of interaction: if the mental and the physical are radically different kinds of
things, i.e different from each other, how could they interact with each other while still keeping a unified
picture of a creature possessed of both a mind and a body [27]? On the other hand, physicalism assumes
that everything is physical, and that mental states are just physical states. Physicalism has two main
problems. The first one is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how does experience arise from
a physical basis? [23,25,26]. The second problem of physicalism comes from its basic assumption of
objectivity: there exist physical objects whose existence is independent of any consciousness. However,
there is an epistemic issue here. Essentially, "our knowledge is limited to the realm of our own subjective
impressions, allowing us no knowledge of objective reality in and of itself" [7,28]. This means that
consciousness-independent objectivity is always an assumption that can never be verified.
To deal with those issues, we remove the assumption of objectivity, we take consciousness as
fundamental and work on the basis that all physical phenomena arise from consciousness. In other
words, we assume that all primary objects are indeed conscious-dependent. These fundamental and
interdependent interactions form a process theory for consciousness (section 2 and 4).
This specific conception of consciousness as fundamental differs from other Western philosophies
that also consider consciousness as fundamental. Some examples are (proto)-panpsychism and idealism.
The former convey the combination problem [29] and the later the dual version of the hard problem of
consciousness: how do physical phenomenon arise from a subjective basis? One concrete example is the
recent conscious agent model [5,30], where the world consists of conscious agents and their experiences.
The conscious agent model focuses on the computational properties of consciousness [5] and approach
the mind-body relationship considering the fundamental agent independent, i.e. existing by itself.
In view of these, to realise the principle of consciousness as fundamental, we follow the Eastern
philosophy known as Yogacara. In our model, consciousness as fundamental becomes an axiom that is
equally as valid, but which is more promising at filling "missing gaps", than a model where matter and
objectivity are seen as fundamental.
3.3. Yogacara Philosophy
Yogacara (Sanskrit for Yoga Practice), also called Vijnanavada (Doctrine of Consciousness) or
Vijnaptimatra (Consciousness Only), is one of the two main branches of Mahayana (Great Vehicle)
Buddhism (the other being Madhyamaka, Middle way). The key feature of the Yogacara philosophy is
consciousness-only which works on the basis that there is nothing outside of consciousness.
To understand the idea of consciousness-only, we should understand another concept from
Yogacara, namely Trisvabha¯va or the three natures. Trisvabha¯va is the premise that all the possible
forms of existence are divided into three types: i) Parikalpita-svabha¯va, the fully conceptualized
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nature, ii) Paratantra-svabha¯va, the other-dependent nature, and iii) Parinis.panna-svabha¯va, the
perfect-accomplished-real nature. As explained by [4]: "The first nature is the nature of existence produced
from attachment to imaginatively constructed discrimination. The second nature is the nature of
existence arising from causes and conditions. The third nature is the nature of existence being perfectly
accomplished (real)", which is "the ultimate reality, something that never changes". It is actually "the
perfect, complete, real nature of all dharmas" [31].
These three natures are inseparable from the mind (translated from the Sanskrit word Citta) and its
attributes (Citta-Caittas). This is clearly stated in Cheng Weishi Lun [32], a representative work of the
Yogacara School in China and translated to English by [31] and [33], where consciousness is actually of
the second nature of existence: the other-dependent nature. In the following, this "other dependence" is
taken as the main feature of consciousness processes, unlike the common view of fundamental physical
particles, whose existences are identified by their own properties like mass, spin and charge, thus
independent of others.
The concept of "mind" in the Yogacara School has a rich structure. It is divided into eight types of
consciousnesses: the first seven consciousnesses—the five sense-consciousnesses (eye or visual, ear or
auditory, nose or olfactory, tongue or gustatory, body or tactile consciousnesses), mental consciousness
(the sixth consciousness), manas consciousness (the seventh or thought-centre consciousness), and
the eighth consciousness—alaya consciousness (storehouse consciousness). Among them the Alaya
consciousness is of particular note in that the “act of perception of the eighth consciousness is extremely
subtle, and therefore difficult to perceive. Indeed the Alaya is described as incomprehensible because
it’s internal object (the Bijas (seeds) and the sense-organs held by it) is extremely subtle while its external
object (the receptacle-world) is immeasurable in its magnitude” [33]. These eight consciousnesses are not
independent of each other. "...the Alaya consciousness and the first seven consciousnesses generate each
in a steady process and are reciprocally cause and effect. [31]". As a feature of the Yogocara School, "in
the Three Worlds (Dhatus in Sanskrit) there is nothing but mind" [33], which means consciousness-only
in the world.
Each type of consciousness is capable of being transformed (parinama in Sanskrit) into two
divisions: the perceived division (nimittabhaga in Sanskrit) and the perceiving division (darsanabhaga
in Sanskrit), and the function of the latter is to perceive the former. The phenomenon of the physical
world and the body which we feel everyday comes from the perceived division of Alaya consciousness:
"it transforms internally into seeds and the body provided with organs, and externally into the world
receptacle. These things that are its transformations become its own object of perception (dlanzbana)"
[31]. The receptacle-world and the Body as part of the perceived division of Alaya consciousness should
not be thought of as the physical world and the physical body that we feel in our normal lives, but as being
related in that the appearance of the latter is based on the existence of the former. As a consequence, the
objectivity of theworld comes from the same structure shared by different sentient beings in the perceived
division of their Alaya consciousnesses. Furthermore, we note that the sixth consciousness (mental
consciousness) is close to modern notions of awareness. Perceptual objects in mental consciousness are
known as the inner or the sixth guna, which are composed of impressions of colours, shapes, sounds,
smells, tastes, and touches.
3.4. Yogacara philosophy compared to Idealism
Starting from consciousness as fundamental, we now compare two main choices: Western idealism
or Eastern Yogacara philosophy. Yogacara philosophy is different from idealism in many aspects. We
mention here just a few points of difference. The first difference is the richer structure of consciousness.
Yogacara identifies eight different types of consciousness and their relationships. Idealism and other
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types of monism do not have this complex structure. Secondly, the interdependence between the three
natures of existence, and specifically between types of consciousness. The eight consciousnesses are
reciprocally a cause and effect of the others [31], while idealism in general does not present these
reciprocal cause and effect interactions. The third difference corresponds to the concept of Alaya
consciousness itself. The subtle nature of Alaya consciousness in addition to the perceived and the
perceiving division is absent in philosophies such as idealism. The world arises from the perceived and
the mind from perceiving transformations of Alaya consciousness. In other words, they share similar
structures, but they are not reduced to each other, as would happen in idealism or materialism. A final
main difference is the third nature (perfect-accomplished-real nature) which is the real nature of each
consciousness process in Yogacara philosophy. The feature of this real nature lies in that it is unchangeable
and unconditional, never affecting nor being affected by other things; on the other hand, it makes the
existence of any changeable thing possible: things can not exist if they have no real nature, and can not
change if they have self-identities. Idealism does not have such features.
4. Compositional Model for Consciousness-Only
After the discussion in section 3, we provide a compositional model of consciousness based on the
Yogacara philosophy of consciousness-only. The full enterprise means to use process theory and model
the eight types of consciousness and their relations. Nevertheless, in this paper, we first focus on the
model of two important types: Alaya consciousness and mental consciousness. We leave the modelling
of the manas consciousness and the five sense-consciousnesses for future work.
4.1. Process Theory for Alaya Consciousness
The first step is to show how to model Alaya consciousness. In order for this, we need to
make explicit the key features of Alaya consciousness. The first feature of Alaya consciousness is
other-dependence, which means each process of Alaya consciousness is dependent on other processes.
The general process theory can not display the other-dependence feature becausemost of its processes are
not specified (see section 2.3). So we need a fine-grained version of process theory which has generators
specified by explicit rewriting rules. The second feature of Alaya consciousness is its deepness and
subtleness. To realise this featurewe request that each process in the chosen process theory has no explicit
meaning in consciousness and any parameter appeared in the theory is not a concrete number. The third
feature of Alaya consciousness is that the structure of the physical world is included in its perceived
division. Since quantum theory is a fundamental formalism for the physical world, we would expect the
fine-grained process theory to be quantum-related and has space and time arising from.
Based on the requirements for a fine-grained process theory that are noted above, we introduce
a formalism called qufinite ZX∆-calculus, which is a generalisation of the normal ZX-calculus [22]
regarding the following aspects: 1) a labelled triangle symbol is introduced as a new generator, that’s
why there is a ∆ in the name of the generalised ZX-calculus, 2) all the qudit ZX-calculus (ZX-calculus for
qudits– quantum versions of d-ary digits) are unified in a single framework, 3) the parameters (phases)
of normal ZX-calculus are generalised from complex numbers to elements of an arbitrary commutative
semiring.
We claim that the qufinite ZX∆-calculus meet all the requirements of a desired fine-grained process
theory for Alaya consciousness. First, all the processes in the qufinite ZX∆-calculus are either generators
themselves which are specified by relations with other diagrams or are composed of generators, so
other-dependence is realised. Second, all the processes in the qufinite ZX∆-calculus are just diagrams
without explicit meaning, and parameters are just general elements of an arbitrary commutative semiring.
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Therefore deepness and subtleness are embodied. Finally, the qufinite ZX∆-calculus is naturally
quantum-related and has the compact structure which relates space and time.
We give the details below of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus: generators, rewriting rules and its standard
interpretation. Throughout this section, N = {0, 1, 2, · · · } is the set of natural numbers, 2 ≤ d ∈ N, ⊕ is
the modulo d addition, S is an arbitrary commutative semiring [34]. All the diagrams are read from top
to bottom as in previous sections.
4.1.1. Generators of Qufinite ZX∆-calculus
We give the generators of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus in Table 1.
m
n
−→αd
...
...
m
n
...
...
d
d dj
d
s t
s s
ss
st
ts
s
st
t
Table 1. Generators of qufinite ZX∆-calculus, where m, n ∈ N;
−→αd = (a1, · · · , ad−1); ai ∈ S ; i ∈ {1, · · · , d−
1}; j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}; s, t ∈ N\{0}.
Remark 1. Each input or output of a generator is labeled by a positive integer. For simplicity, the first four
generators have each of their inputs and outputs labelled by d, and we just give one label to a wire.
For simplicity, we use the following conventions:
−→
1 d
...
d
...
:=
...
...
d
:=
dj
dj
d
:= dj
dj
dk :=
−−→ed−k
and
ε : ·
·
·
·
·
·
· ··
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
:=
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where
−→
1 d =
d−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1, · · · , 1); j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d − 1}; k ∈ {1, · · · , d − 1};−−→ed−k =
d−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−k
, · · · , 0); ε
represents an empty diagram.
4.1.2. Rules of Qufinite ZX∆-calculus
We provide rewriting rules for qufinite ZX∆-calculus in Figure 1 and Figure 2. These rules specify
the generators as listed in Table 1. Concretely, it means that two or more generators define each other. For
example, the green dot
d
is specified by the rule
d
=
d
d
d in the way that it is the only green
spider which has no input and one output and can be copied by the red spider d . Moreover, the
red spider d is also specified by the effects in the green dot
d
.
...
=
...
−→
βd...
...
−−→
αdβd..
. −−→αdβd
...
...
...
=
−→αd
...
= =d d0
d
=
d
d d
=
di
dj
di⊕j
=...
...
...d...
=
...
...
d
......d
d
...
d
...
...
...d =
=
dd
d
d
d
d
d
d
=
d
d
d
=
d
d
d
m m
......
d
= d
dj dj
dj
·
= ·
−→αd ·
· ·
·
·
·
·
·
d
·
·
·· ·
·
=
d
=d
d
dj dj
dj
Figure 1. Qufinite ZX∆-calculus rules I, where
−→αd = (a1, · · · , ad−1);
−→
βd = (b1, · · · , bd−1);
−−→
αdβd =
(a1b1, · · · , ad−1bd−1); ak, bk ∈ S ; k ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1}; j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1};m ∈ N.
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d
=
d
d d
dj
=
dj
−→αd+
−→
1d
−→αd
=
d
=−→
0d d
−→αd
d
d
d
d
d=
d
−→αd
−→αd
d
d
=
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
=
d
d d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d =
d
d
−→αd
−→
βd
−→αd+
−→
βd
st
ts =
st
st
st
ts
ts
=
s t
st
ts
stu
u
=
us
stu
tu
t
st
s t
stst
= st
Figure 2. Qufinite ZX∆-calculus rules II, where
−→
1 d =
d−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1, · · · , 1);
−→
0 d =
d−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 0);−→αd =
(a1, · · · , ad−1);
−→
βd = (b1, · · · , bd−1); ak, bk ∈ S ; k ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1}; j ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1}; s, t, u ∈ N\{0}.
In order to form a compact closed category of diagrams, we also need the following structural rules:
=
ss s s
=
s s s s
= = s
s
s s sss
(1)
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=
...
...
......
...
...
=
... ...
=
s1 s2 sk
t1 t2 tl
u
u
s1 s2 sk s1 s2 sk s1 s2 sk
t1 t2 tl t1 t2 tl t1 t2 tl
u
uu
u
u
u
s
s t
t
ts
ts
(2)
where
s1
tl
s2
t2t1
...
...
sk
is an arbitrary diagram in the qufinite ZX∆-calculus.
The first two diagrams in equation (1) mean the cap ηs and the cup ǫs are symmetric, while the
last diagram means the connected cap and cup can be yanked. The first two diagrams of equation (2)
mean any diagram could move across a line freely, representing the naturality of the swap morphism.
The last diagram of equation (2) means the swap morphism is self-inverse. Note that now we have
a self-dual compact structure rather than a general compact structure, which makes representation of
diagrams much easier.
From the rewriting rules noted above, we form a strict self-dual compact closed category Z of ZX
diagrams. The objects of Z are all the positive integers, and the monoidal product on these objects are
multiplication of integer numbers. Denote the set of generators listed in Table 1 as G. Let Z [G] be a free
monoidal category generated by G in the following way - i) any two diagrams D1 and D2 are placed
side-by-side with D1 on the left of D2 to form the monoidal product on morphisms D1 ⊗ D2, or ii) the
outputs ofD1 connect with the inputs ofD2when their types all match to each other to form the sequential
composition of morphisms D2 ◦D1. The empty diagram is a unit of parallel composition and the diagram
of a straight line is a unit of the sequential composition. Denote the set of rules listed in Figure 1, Figure
2, equations (1) and equations (2) by R. One can check that rewriting one diagram to another diagram
according to the rules of R is an equivalence relation on diagrams in Z [G]. We also call this equivalence
as R, then the quotient category Z = Z [G]/R is a strict self-dual compact closed category. The qufinite
ZX∆-calculus is seen as a graphical calculus based on the category Z.
4.1.3. Standard interpretation of qufinite ZX∆-calculus
To ensure that the qufinite ZX∆-calculus is sound, we need to test its rules in a preexisting reliable
systemwhichwe describe in the following. These interpretations, however, does not represent the explicit
meaning in terms of our consciousness processes. They are given here to test soundness.
Let MatS be the category whose objects are non-zero natural numbers and whose morphisms
M : m → n are n × m matrices taking values in a given commutative semiring S . The composition
is matrix multiplication, the monoidal product on objects and morphisms are multiplication of natural
numbers and the Kronecker product of matrices respectively. Then MatS is a strict self-dual compact
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closed category. We give a standard interpretation, namely J·K, for the qufinite ZX∆-calculus diagrams in
MatS : uwwwwwwwv
m
n
−→αd
...
...
}~
=
d−1
∑
i=0
aj |i〉
⊗m 〈i|⊗n ; a0 = 1; ai ∈ S ;
uwwwwwwwv
m
n
...
...
d
}~
= ∑
0≤i1,··· ,im,j1,··· ,jn≤d−1
i1+···+im≡j1+···+jn(mod d)
|i1, · · · , im〉 〈j1, · · · , jn| ;
uwv dj
}~ = d−1∑
i=0
|i〉 〈i⊕ j| ;
t
d
|
= |0〉 〈0|+
d−1
∑
i=1
(|0〉+ |i〉) 〈i| ;
uv
d
}~ = d−1∑
i=0
|i〉 〈i| ;
uv
st
ts
}~ = s−1∑
k=0
t−1
∑
l=0
|kt+ l〉 〈kl| ;
uv
s
st
t
}~ = st−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣[ kt ]
〉 ∣∣∣∣k− t[ kt ]
〉
〈k| ;
t
·
·
·
·
·
·
· ··
·
·
·
·
·
·
· |
= 1;
uwwv
s t
}~ = s−1∑
k=0
t−1
∑
l=0
|kl〉 〈lk| ;
s
s s
{
=
s−1
∑
i=0
|i〉 |i〉 ;
s
ss
{
=
s−1
∑
i=0
〈i| 〈i| ;
JD1 ⊗ D2K = JD1K⊗ JD2K; JD1 ◦ D2K = JD1K ◦ JD2K;
where s, t ∈ N\{0}; 〈i| =
d︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i+1
, · · · , 0); |i〉 = (
d︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i+1
, · · · , 0))T ; i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}; and [r] is the
integer part of a real number r.
One can verify that the qufinite ZX∆-calculus is sound in the sense that for any two diagrams
D1,D2 ∈ Z, D1 = D2 must imply that JD1K = JD2K. This standard interpretation J·K is actually a strict
symmetric monoidal functor from Z toMatS .
According the standard interpretation, if S is the field of complex numbers, then the green spider
corresponds to the computational basis |i〉}d−1i=0 , with d− 1 phase angles. The red spider corresponds to
the Fourier basis coming from Fourier transformation of the computational basis, up to a global scalar.
The red dj diagram represents the j-th unitary which is also a permutation matrix, with j ranging from 0
to d. The triangle diagram labelled with d acts as a successor of phase parameters (adding 1’s to them).
The two trapezium diagrams represent unitaries between the Hilbert space of Hs ⊗Ht and the Hilbert
space Hst, these two diagrams are invertible to each other.
Remark 2. Similar to the situation that ZX and ZW calculus over qubits are isomorphic to the category of matrices
with size powers of 2 [35], we would like to prove in future work that the qufinite ZX∆-calculus over semiring S
is isomorphic to the category ofMatS (maybe more rules to be added). If this can be done, then the structure of the
category of diagrams of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus is independent of the choice of generators and rules.
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4.1.4. Modelling Alaya Consciousness
We claim that Alaya consciousness is modelled by the qufinite ZX∆-calculus: A general diagram
represents some sort of conscious process and a diagram with outputs but without inputs will represent
a state of consciousness. Sequential composition of two diagrams represents two successive conscious
processes happening one after the another, while parallel composition of two diagrams represents two
conscious processes happening simultaneously.
Furthermore, we model the perceived and perceiving division of Alaya consciousness. On the one
hand, as we have introduced in section 3.3, the content of the perceived version of Alaya consciousness is
the phenomenon of the physical world and the body which is supposed to have the same mathematical
structure for all sentient beings in this world. Since each physical object is supposed to be composed of
quantum systems, the perceived version of Alaya consciousness is modelled here by the category FdHilb:
the category whose objects are all finite dimensional complex Hilbert spaces and whose morphisms
are linear maps between the Hilbert spaces with ordinary composition of linear maps as compositions
of morphisms. The usual Kronecker tensor product is the monoidal tensor, and the field of complex
numbersC (which is a one-dimensional Hilbert space over itself) is the tensor unit. FdHilb is the category
of quantum processes which composes the physical world.
On the other hand, the function of the perceiving division of Alaya consciousness is to perceive the
perceived division, which means a perceiving action of the Alaya consciousness. Thus, the perceiving
division of Alaya consciousness is modelled by a functor from Z to FdHilb. This functor is set up as a
modification of the standard interpretation functor J·K, i.e.: just choose a semiring homomorphism f from
S to C and let {|i〉}d−1i=0 a standard basis of a Hilbert space with dimension d, then replace ai with f (ai)
in the codomain of the interpretation J·K. One can check that a monoidal functor is obtained in this way,
where a semiring homomorphism from S to C is selected.
4.2. Process Theory for Mental Consciousness
After describing the category for Alaya consciousness, we now consider a model for mental
consciousness. Consider N-semimodules [34] freely generated by a finite set of perceptions (impressions),
either of colours, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes or touch feelings. We call these N-semimodules
single-type perception semimodules. Let X be the category whose objects are finite tensor products of
single-type perception semimodules, and whose morphisms are semimodule homomorphisms between
them [34]. Then X forms a symmetric monoidal category [36]. An object of X is called here an experience
space. We give an example of experience space as follows. An experience space about two shapes of
a square and a triangle is a free N-semimodule with a basis {square, equilateral triangle }. A general
element in this semimodule is of form m(square)+n(equilateral triangle), which means an impression
where there are m squares and n equilateral triangles. Therefore mental consciousness is modelled by
the category X whose objects are explained as experience spaces and whose morphisms are explained as
mental consciousness processes which transform from one experience space to another. The reason why
we use the semi-ring N is because we take our experiences as being basically finite.
As we described in section 3.3, mental consciousness (or the sixth consciousness) is generated
from the alaya consciousness. Since mental consciousness and alaya consciousness are modelled by the
category X and the category Z respectively, it is natural to model the generation of mental consciousness
as a symmetric monoidal functor from Z to X. First, we set up a functor F from FdHilbN to X, where
FdHilbN is the category obtained from FdHilb by restricting the coefficients of complex numbers to
natural numbers. Clearly we can have an interpretation of diagrams of Z in FdHilbN similar to J·K, which
is denoted by J·KN. For each object Hn of dimension n, F (Hn) is a single-type perception semimodule
generated by n elements {xi}
n−1
i=0 which has a bijection σ : |i〉 → xi with an orthonormal basis {|i〉}
n−1
i=0 of
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Hn. Obviously, σ and σ
−1 can be linearly extended to semimodule homomorphisms which will be called
with the same names. For each linear map f from Hm to Hn, F ( f ) is the semimodule homomorphism
σ ◦ f ◦ σ−1. Also we give the morphism
F (JgKN) : F (Hs)⊗F (Ht) −→ F (Hst)
xi ⊗ xj 7→ xit+j
where g is the following generator of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus:
st
ts
One can check that F (JgKN) is a natural isomorphism and F is a symmetric monoidal functor. Then
the functor from Z to X is given by the composite functor B = F ◦ J·KN, which is a symmetric monoidal
functor (SMF) since both components are SMFs.
5. The Unity of Experience
As an application of our model of consciousness, we consider the combination problem on the unity
of experience. Our approach is an alternative to conserve the irreducible and fundamental nature of
experience. It is not, however, the only one. Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, among others, also
consider experience seriously, but assigns a quantifiable character to that experience. According to these
views, consciousness is present in all fundamental physical entities [37] and the composition of basic
blocks of experience creates our conscious experience. Nevertheless, an important question remains:
How "microphenomenal seeds of consciousness" constitute macrophenomenal conscious experiences
as we experience them? —the so-called combination problem for Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
[29]. In other words, how these building blocks of experience compound one single unified phenomenal
subjective experience [24]: the phenomenal unity of experience [24,38]. Basically, the dualism between
mind and matter is now replaced by two modes, micro and macro experience, of the same ontology.
5.1. The combination Problem
The combination problem has three aspects [29]: structural, subject and quality. Each one of these
aspects leads to a specific sub-problem. On the one hand, the structure of the micro world, mostly
associated with quantum mechanics, gives the impression of being different from the structure of macro
experiences. This is the structural mismatch problem, which also appears between macro experience
structure and macro physical structures in the brain [29]. On the other hand, there is the question of how
micro subject and micro qualities combine to give rise to macro subjects and qualities. It seems that no
group of micro subjects need the existence of a macro subject, and additionally, it is not clear how possible
limited micro qualities yield to the many macro qualities that can be experienced, including different
colors, shapes, sounds, smells, and tastes (for detail see [29]). According to Chalmers, a satisfactory
solution of the combination problem must face all these three aspects.
Our framework targets all of these aspects of the combination problem. First, the mathematical
structure of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus for Alaya consciousness is a unification of all dimensional qudit
ZX-calculus. If generators are interpreted in Hilbert space, the latest becomes a graphical language for
quantum theory. This means that the ZX∆-calculus for conscious processes shares a similar structure
to quantum theory. This similarity solves the mismatch at the level of micro experience. At the level
of macro experiences we avoid any match or mismatch with macro physical structures because the
model does not reduce experience to neural events (non-isomorphic relationship). Second, the model
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does not distinguish between subject and quality, everything is a conscious process. Those fundamental
conscious processes of reality, namely the generators of the theory, compound other conscious processes
just by means of connecting them together: via sequential and parallel composition. The result of those
compositions are other subjective and qualitative processes. New compounded processes depend on the
basic generators, while the generators are interrelated to define themselves. In other words, each process
need other processes to specify itself. If someone insists on generators being matched with subjects or
agents, then micro (generators) and macro subjects (composition of generators) necessitate themselves as
imposed by the other dependent nature. This deals with the problem of subject composition. An example
for quality composition in mental consciousness is discussed in the next section. In our framework, unity
of consciousness is naturally described as a result of process composition [39].
5.2. The Combination Problem for Mental Consciousness
One application of the above comments is instantiated for the combination of qualitative experiences
at the level of mental consciousness. Since we have modelled mental consciousness as the category X, the
combination of qualitative experiences should be modelled as a morphism within this category. Given an
experience space of rank s (the smallest number of generators) and an experience space of rank t, we claim
that a combination of experiences from these two spaces to an experience space of rank st is modelled by
the morphism F (JgKN) as given in section 4.2.
Now we show by an example why F (JgKN) could model a combination of experiences. Consider
that there is a colour experience space A2 freely generated by {green, red} and a shape experience space B2
freely generated by {square, circle}. Then F (JgKN) is seen as a combination scheme to gain an experience
space C4 of shapes with colour freely generated by {green square, green circle, red square, red circle}:
F (JgKN) : A2 ⊗ B2 −→ C4
green⊗ square 7→ green square
green⊗ circle 7→ green circle
red⊗ square 7→ red square
red⊗ circle 7→ red circle
where JgKN : H2 ⊗ H2 −→ H4
|00〉 7→ |0〉
|01〉 7→ |1〉
|10〉 7→ |2〉
|11〉 7→ |3〉
Here two combined experiences presented at the same time are modelled by the superposition of the
two experiences. For example, a green square and red circle that show up in our mind simultaneously
are represented as green ⊗ square + red ⊗ circle. One can then check that the morphism F (JgKN) is the
abstract mechanism that realises the combination: given green square and red circle simultaneously, a
green square and a red circle is obtained simultaneously viaF (JgKN); the other cases are similar. Onemay
wonder that whether the morphism F (JgKN) is just a renaming of the basis. In general, any isomorphism
can be seen as a renaming of a basis, however, as we pointed out in section 4.2, F (JgKN) is a natural
isomorphism, thus mathematically more complex than just a renaming of basis.
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6. Conclusions
In approaching the problem of consciousness through the framework of qufinite ZX∆-calculus, we
avoided reductionism in tackling the “hard problem” described above.
Our framework is based on arbitrary commutative semirings as a compositional model of
consciousness, with the emphasis on its potential use for the mathematical and structural studies
of consciousness [19,20]. We utilise generators and processes as abstract mathematical structures,
resembling quantum theory. The philosophy that underlies our approach is taken from the Yogacara
school of Buddhism which assumes that consciousness is fundamental and which characterizes the main
feature of consciousness as other-dependence.
A positive consequence of this approach is that the structure is close, but not the same, as quantum
theory, and if we restrict our semiring to the field of complex numbers, adding the standard interpretation
of the diagrams in matrices, we get to finite-dimensional quantum theory. Therefore, the qufinite
ZX∆-calculus is a unification, in this respect, of all finite dimensional qudit ZX-calcului, which are
graphical languages for quantum theory when interpreted in Hilbert space.
In a future work, we expect to generalise the qufinite ZX∆-calculus to the infinite dimensional case,
fromwhich standard quantummechanics might be recovered. It is to be noted that we have not recovered
standard quantum mechanics. To do so would mean generalising our model in order to derive the
Schrödinger equation. This is important because once subjectivity is taken as fundamental, a new inverse
problem comes into play. Namely, how do objective phenomena such as quantum physics or relativity
arise from subjective experiences?
The aim of models such as the conscious agent model is to recover fundamental physics from the
agent’s interactions, as for instance in quantum mechanics [30]. It is not clear that current versions of
the conscious agent model are capable of recovering the entire objective realm (see objections and replies
section in [30]). In our framework part of the reconstruction goal pursued by the conscious agent model
is achieved for free, andwithout overhead, invoking only phenomenal aspects. In doing so, our approach
to consciousness processes and quantum theory share a similar mathematical structure. We are hopeful
that due to its other-dependent feature, and sufficient generality, our framework may pave the way for
further research on the scientific study of consciousness.
In following works, we also expect the extension of the model to, inter alia, five
sense-consciousnesses and manas consciousness, to consider infinite diagrams for Alaya consciousness
and infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces for its perceived division. This mean adding more structure for
mental consciousness, allowing us to compare our approach to other models of qualia space.
We close by remarking that a process theory for consciousness is not only about modelling
consciousness with any type of mathematics, but about modelling consciousness with category theory in
a graphical form, i.e. axiomatic mathematics. This form of mathematics explicitly introduces structures,
assumptions and axioms. We believe this approach is better suited to describing the conscious experience
as fundamental.
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